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Introduction
The similarity of states' foreign policy positions is a standard variable in the quantitative, dyadic analysis of international relations. The variable is supposed to capture the extent to which pairs of states have shared or opposing interests. Explicitly or implicitly, the degree of similar or opposing state interests forms part of most explanations for international cooperation and conflict. For example, similar state interests are hypothesised to foster bilateral trade (Kastner 2007; Morrow, Siverson, and Tabares 1998) , to increase the chances of receiving military and development aid (Derouen and Heo 2004; Neumayer 2003) , to improve the effective functioning of international institutions (Stone 2004) , to reduce the incentives to harbour foreign terrorist groups (Bapat 2007) , and, of course, to decrease the risk of conflict and militarized disputes (Bearce, Flanagan, and Floros 2006; Braumoeller 2008; Gartzke 2007; Long and Leeds 2006 ).
Yet despite the importance of this variable, the measurement of foreign policy similarity has received little attention. Bueno de Mesquita (1975) originally proposed Kendall's (1938) rank-order correlation coefficient τ b as a measure of similarity. According to this measure, the foreign policy ties of two states are maximally similar if their rankings exhibit perfect covariation. Signorino and Ritter (1999) objected to the use of τ b on conceptual grounds. They argue that τ b does not indicate the extent to which two states share the same types of foreign policy ties to other states, but only the extent to which the two states rank their foreign policy ties to other states in a similar manner (Signorino and Ritter 1999, 121) . Signorino and Ritter (1999) propose S as an alternative measure. According to this measure, the foreign policy tie profiles of two states are maximally similar if they match exactly, regardless of whether or not the strength of foreign policy ties covaries. Signorino and Ritter's S has since become the prevailing measure of foreign policy positions in the statistical analyses of international relations.
1 Despite its growing popularity, few studies have subsequently examined the properties of S. While Bennett and Rupert (2003) and Sweeney and Keshk (2005) have pointed to some empirical and conceptual problems of S, they have not suggested feasible alternatives.
In this paper, I discuss the application of chance-corrected agreement indices to assess the similarity of states' foreign policy positions. Even though these measures have been developed in a different context for different research applications, their conceptual properties make them uniquely suited for measuring the similarity of foreign policy positions in the study of international relations. The inquiry is motivated by the observation that S often yields implausible similarity scores. The lack of face validity of S is illustrated in the left panel of alliance ties with all other states in the international system. The assumption underlying the use of these data is that any similarity in alliance commitments is a result of similar foreign policy positions (Altfeld and Mesquita 1979, 116) . We know that the UK's security interests during the Cold War were relatively close to those of France and the United States (US). At the same time, the UK had very different interests from those of China and the Soviet Union. The S values for 1 A search in the Social Science Citation Index for articles citing Signorino and Ritter (1999) returns 126 matches (http://isiwebofknowledge.com [accessed April 26, 2011] the UK-France dyad and the UK-US dyad are roughly in line with the historical record.
However, the UK-Soviet Union and UK-China dyads show S values that are too high in comparison. During the entire period, the UK's S score with the Soviet Union is very similar and sometimes even higher than its S score with the US. The S values for the UK-China dyad are even more implausible. They indicate that, during the entire Cold War period, the interests of the UK were considerably more similar to those of China than to those of the US.
FIGURE 1 about here
In the remainder of this paper, I show that the lack of face validity of S is a result of the measure's way of standardizing the extent of dissimilarity of states' foreign policy tie profiles.
At its core, S measures the dissimilarity of states' tie profiles and adjusts it for the theoretically possible maximum dissimilarity. Features of the observed empirical distributions of individual dyad members' foreign policy ties are not taken into account. In substantive terms, the distribution-independent standardization in the calculation of S implies that the measure neglects two fundamental aspects of the international state system: the low density of foreign policy ties in the system and the innate differences of individual states to form such ties. In contrast, chancecorrected agreement indices offer distribution-dependent ways of standardizing the extent of dissimilarity. Scott's (1955) π and Cohen's (1960) κ adjust the observed dissimilarity of tie profiles for a generally low propensity of dyad members to form foreign policy ties. In addition, κ takes into account that individual dyad members may differ in their propensity to form ties.
Before discussing the calculation and advantages of these indices in more detail, it is worth having a preliminary look at the resulting empirical differences in the similarity values of the different measures. The middle and right panel of Figure 1 show the UK's similarity scores based on π and κ, respectively. The similarity scores for the UK-France and the UK-US dyad remain positive and relatively large when the agreement indices are applied instead of S.
However, the scores for the UK-China and the UK-Soviet Union dyad are now much lower and consistently negative for most of the time period examined. While the differences between π and κ are generally small, the significantly lower π score of the UK-China dyad is noteworthy.
Keeping their minor differences in mind, we can conclude for the moment that the two chancecorrected agreement indices produce similarity scores that are clearly more in line with the conventional wisdom about states' foreign policy positions during the Cold War than S.
In the next section, I present a brief review of how similarity scores are calculated according to S. Then I describe in more detail the two weaknesses of S that result in implausible similarity scores. Having identified the problems affecting S, I propose Cohen's κ and Scott's π as two useful alternatives and describe their computation. For conceptual clarity and ease of exposition, my discussion of the limitations of S and the computation of π and κ relies on data about binary foreign policy ties. As most current applications use valued tie data to measure the similarity of foreign policy positions, I subsequently describe extensions of π and κ to assess the similarity of ties whose strength is measured on a quantitative scale. 2 Empirical comparisons of 2 I borrow the distinction between binary and valued data from social network analysis. The former type of data indicates only the presence or absence of ties, while the latter also indicates the strength of ties (Scott 2000, 47) . The version of κ for valued or quantitative data is also known as weighted κ (Cohen 1968) , ܽ ̅ (Krippendorff 1970) , chance-corrected identity coefficient (Zegers 1986) , concordance correlation coefficient (Lin 1989) , and fixed marginal agreement coefficient (Fay 2005) . The version of π for quantitative data is also known as ܽ ோ (Krippendorff 1970) and random marginal agreement coefficient (Fay 2005) . All similarity measures discussed in this paper are available for download from AUTHOR'S WEBPAGE. This those measures show that the distribution of S strongly differs from the distributions of the two chance-corrected indices. Thus, the two types of measures are clearly not interchangeable. This conclusion is also confirmed by a replication of Gartzke's (2007) study of the 'Capitalist Peace'.
The replication results demonstrate that the two types of similarity measures can lead to substantially different statistical inferences. Although the two chance-corrected indices yield similar values and replication results in these examples, the use of one or the other implies very different assumptions about the data generation process. Thus, the decision about which chancecorrected index to apply should be guided by theoretical considerations.
Measuring the similarity of foreign policy positions with S
Foreign policy positions of states are hard to observe directly. One way to measure them is to rely on an indicator of observable behavior that 'reveals' the preferences responsible for generating that behavior. Traditionally, data on alliance portfolios have been used to assess the similarity of foreign policy positions (Altfeld and Mesquita 1979) . For ease of exposition, I
follow this convention in the conceptual discussion and comparison of similarity measures. 3 The assumption underlying the use of alliance data is that similar alliance portfolios are the result of collection includes measures based on binary as well as valued ties for all state system members (Correlates of War Project 2005), calculated from alliance and UN voting data (1946 UN voting data ( -2004 . The 'rmac' package (Kirk 2010 ) in R (R Development Core Team 2011 implements the computation of the interrater-agreement indices as described by Fay (2005) . 3 In principle, similarity measures can be calculated with any relational data set (Sweeney and Keshk 2005) . Besides alliance data, the use of data on voting in the UN General Assembly has been popular (Gartzke 1998 The subsequent conversion of the dissimilarity into a similarity score is also the same. The measures only differ in the way in which dissimilarity values are standardized. As mentioned earlier, these differences in the standardization result in crucial differences in similarity scores.
Before turning to a discussion of the chance-corrected agreement indices, I review the computation of S and investigate the reasons for its lack of face validity. Equation (1) presents a simplified version of the formula for the calculation of S:
The more general formula given by Signorino and Ritter (1999, 127) does not specify a specific distance metric and allows for the incorporation and differential weighting of additional types of foreign policy ties. In practice, most existing research has relied on the absolute value distance 4 The vectors also include an entry for each of the dyad members. Relationships of states to themselves are coded as defence pacts and therefore receive the maximum scale value (Bueno de Mesquita 1975, 195 Capability-weighting means that a lot of information about most countries is effectively discarded from the sample (e.g., the five largest powers in 1985 contribute more than 50 per cent to the calculation of dissimilarity values in that year).
The effective restriction of the sample to a few very powerful states leads only to more plausible S scores if those states have a higher propensity to establish foreign policy ties than the excluded, less powerful ones. Such a relationship will then result in generally less and more meaningful shared absences of foreign policy ties. While such a positive association between material capabilities and the total number of foreign policy ties indeed exists, it is far from perfect. Thus, weighting is at best a second-best solution. Chance-corrected agreement indices provide a solution that does not rely on an additional data source with all its potential for introducing further measurement error. Also, a more fundamental objection is that weighting is essentially a sampling decision and should be made independent of measurement issues. If weighting ties is deemed desirable to assess the similarity of foreign policy positions, then any measure of similarity should be calculated on weighted data, including Scott's π and Cohen's κ.
Relying on equation (1), Figure 2 illustrates the calculation of S with a hypothetical example. The data consist of binary alliance ties indicating the presence (1) or absence (0) of any alliance commitment between dyad members X and Y and the other states A to H in the 5 The squared distance metric (ܺ − ܻ ) ଶ would be a prominent alternative.
international system. Relying on binary data makes the exposition easier and allows us to distinguish qualitative properties of the different measures from properties of the distance metric.
Unless stated otherwise, all discussed issues apply analogously to valued tie data as well.
Regarding the entries in Panel (a) of Figure 2 , the first row of the matrix indicates that state X has an alliance commitment to itself while state Y does not have an alliance commitment to state X.
The second row indicates the converse situation. State Y has an alliance commitment to itself but not to state X. The other rows provide information about the two dyad members' alliance commitments to the remaining states in the international system. The two tie profiles are similar in that both states share an alliance commitment to state E and both do not have alliance commitments with states C, D, G, and H. However, the two tie profiles are dissimilar in that only X has an alliance commitment to B and only Y has an alliance commitment to A and F.
FIGURE 2 about here
We can compute the S score of the X-Y dyad directly from the matrix given in Panel (a) of We can derive the proportion of dissimilarity value more easily from a contingency table.
The contingency table view is useful because it provides a straightforward summary of the main Dividing the total number of dissimilar alliance ties by the total number of countries yields the
When the contingency table indicates relative rather than absolute frequencies, the proportion of dissimilarity can be computed even more directly by just adding up the relative frequencies in the off-diagonal cells of the table. According to Signorino and Ritter (1999, 121-123) , the main advantage of S over association measures like ߬ is exactly this insensitivity to the lack or form of covariation. However, inferring the similarity of foreign policy positions by comparing dyad members' behaviour is only possible by assessing the degree to which dyad members' behaviour varies in similar ways.
Covariation between variables is generally accepted as one of the main conditions for establishing causality (De Vaus 2001, 34; Kellstedt and Whitten 2008, 48) . Thus, if two tie profiles do not covary or covary in a negative way, then they are clearly not causally related to similar foreign policy positions. Also in this sense, Scott's π and Cohen's κ are improvements.
Cohen's κ is actually a chance-corrected measure of association (Zegers 1986) , and Scott's π will never indicate a positive similarity value in the absence of a positive association between the tie profiles (Fay 2005, 175) . From this point of view, the problem of ߬ is not its reliance on covariation, but its lack of chance-correction. 8 The issues discussed here have long been identified in the literature on assessing inter-rater agreement. However, in that context, they have usually been interpreted as problems of Cohen's κ rather than problems of the proportion of dissimilarity (Byrt, Bishop, and Carlin 1993; Cicchetti and Feinstein 1990; Feinstein and Cicchetti 1990; Lantz and Nebenzahl 1996; Sim and Wright 2005) . For an exception, see Vach (2005) .
In Panel (a), the marginal distributions indicate that both dyad members have a 50 per cent propensity to establish an alliance. In this case, the marginal distribution put no constraint on the empirically possible minimum and maximum dissimilarity value. As the lower two tables in
Panel ( 100 per cent. Thus, the observed proportion of dissimilarity is actually at its empirically possible minimum; it could not be any smaller. This information is also not reflected in the S score.
As discussed earlier, networks in international relations often exhibit low density. The establishment and maintenance of bilateral relationships between states are usually costly. As a result, these relationships are relatively rare and the absence of ties is much more common.
Panel (b) of Figure 3 illustrates that in such situations the unadjusted proportion of dissimilarity tends to indicate too little dissimilarity, resulting in S scores that seem too high. While this prevalence of non-ties is widely accepted as a problem for measuring the similarity of foreign policy ties (Bennett and Rupert 2003, 372; Signorino and Ritter 1999, 124; Sweeney and Keshk 2005, 175) , the differential biases of states as a source of implausible similarity values might be more controversial. Yet if foreign policy ties are costly to establish and maintain, then states are likely to differ systematically in their willingness and capability to bear such costs. For example, the United States are much more prepared and able to maintain an extensive net of alliance partners around the globe than Luxembourg. The degree to which states engage in alliance commitments is first and foremost driven by capability. If Luxembourg does not have the capability to come to the aid of Bolivia and Bolivia does not have the capability to come to the aid of Luxembourg in the case of a militarized conflict, then a defence pact between those two states seems unlikely. But even if a state is generally capable of projecting its force overseas, it might regard military alliances as an inadequate means to pursue its security interests and therefore consciously limit its engagement in these kinds of international arrangements. Neither the capability nor the general willingness to engage in military alliances reveals underlying foreign policy preferences. Foreign policy preferences are mainly reflected in the state's choice of alliance partners given a specific propensity to engage in such behaviour, less so in the propensity to engage in such behaviour itself. Panel (c) of Figure 3 demonstrates that such differences in the propensity of states to form alliances will result in an unadjusted proportion of dissimilarity that indicates more dissimilarity than warranted, resulting in similarity scores of S that seem too low.
The independence of the propensity to form foreign policy ties from the choice of partner might vary with the costs involved in establishing and maintaining a tie. The assumption is certainly quite plausible in the case of alliance commitments, but might be less justifiable for 'cheaper' types of ties. A prime example of less costly relationships would be ties formed through identical or similar voting in the UN General Assembly (e.g. Gartzke 1998) . In this case, the act of voting is equally costly, regardless of whether the country votes 'Yes', 'Abstain', or 'No'. The only cost a country might incur in these situations is directly related to which other countries it chooses to support or oppose through its vote. In this case, asymmetrically distributed marginals are mainly due to real differences in foreign policy positions. Fortunately, chance-corrected agreement indices can handle both situations. Cohen's κ corrects the proportion of dissimilarity for both prevalence and bias, but Scott's π only corrects it for the prevalence of a certain type of tie. The latter measure is therefore more appropriate in the case where foreign policy ties are cheap. In the next section, I describe the computation of both measures.
Chance-correction to account for prevalence and bias
A certain proportion of dissimilar alliance ties is 'harder' to achieve in the face of symmetrically unbalanced marginal distributions (i.e. prevalence) than in the face of balanced marginal distributions. In contrast, the same proportion of dissimilarity is 'easier' to achieve in the face of asymmetrically unbalanced marginal distributions (i.e. bias) than in the face of balanced marginal distributions. Thus, the proportion of dissimilarity needs to be adjusted upward in the case of prevalence and downward in the case of bias. Chance-corrected agreement indices accomplish both of these tasks. In general, these indices take the following form (e.g. Krippendorff 1970, 140) : 
Inserting this result and the right-hand side of equation (3) into equation (2) yields S, expressed as a chance-corrected agreement index:
Equation (6) In the case of binary data, the chance-correction of S reduces to the assumption that all states are just as likely to form alliance ties as they are likely to form non-alliance ties. 10 The expected dissimilarity defines the zero value of chance-corrected coefficients (Krippendorff 2004, 416) . Thus, whenever the actual marginal distributions deviate from the form of the marginal distributions assumed by S, the similarity values of S will be over-or understated.
Scott's π chance-correction adjusts for prevalence, but assumes that states do not exhibit any biases. In our context, the measure assumes that all states have a similar propensity to engage in military alliances; the 'true' marginal distributions of the two dyad members are supposed to be homogenous (Zwick 1988, 367) . However, unlike S which assumes an identical 10 In the case of valued data, the standardization is equivalent to assuming that all states have a 50 per cent propensity to form a tie with the theoretically possible maximum strength and a 50
per cent propensity to form a tie with the theoretically possible minimum strength.
propensity of 0.5, π does not assume that states' common propensity to form alliance ties takes any specific value. Rather, dyad members' common propensity is estimated from the data in the contingency table by averaging the respective marginal proportions:
The estimated marginal proportions are then used to calculate the expected chance dissimilarity by plugging them into equation (4). Given the assumption of homogeneous marginal distributions, the chance-correction of π takes the following form:
Inserting the right-hand sides of equations (7) and (3) into equation (2) yields the formula for Scott's π:
Unlike S and Scott's π, Cohen's κ does not make the assumption of marginal homogeneity (Zwick 1988) . Variation in states' propensity to form ties is not taken as a sign of dissimilarity but considered to be due to causes unrelated to the choice of tie partner. The calculation of κ's chance-dissimilarity relies directly on the observed marginal proportions as best guesses for the 'true' marginal proportions: ݉ • = ‫‬ • and ݉ • = ‫‬ • . Inserting these terms into equation (4) yields the following formula for the chance-correction of κ:
Inserting the right-hand side of equations (9) and (3) into equation (2) gives the formula for
Cohen's κ:
The calculation of the different measures and the effects of prevalence and bias are best illustrated through a few examples. Figure 4 illustrates the computation of the similarity measures in the absence of bias and prevalence. In this hypothetical example, alliance ties are just as common as non-alliance ties and both dyad members have the same propensity to form alliance ties. The observed proportion of dissimilarity is calculated by adding up the proportions in the off-diagonal cells of the contingency table:
The observed proportion of dissimilarity is always the same for all three similarity measures.
However, in the absence of bias and prevalence, the chance-dissimilarity is the same for all three As a consequence of the equality of the marginal proportions, the proportion of dissimilarity expected by chance is 0.5 for all three measures as well. In the example, the chance-dissimilarity is slightly larger than the actually observed dissimilarity of 0.4, resulting in a moderately positive similarity score of 0.2. Taking into account that a large dissimilarity score is more 'difficult' to achieve when both dyad members have a large number of non-alliance ties, the proportion of dissimilar ties expected by chance reduces from 0.5 to 0.32 in the case of the agreement indices. This value is smaller than the observed proportion of dissimilarity of 0.4. As a consequence, the similarity scores of π and κ change from a moderate positive value of 0.2 to a moderate negative value of -0.25.
FIGURE 5 about here
In the two examples considered so far, dyad members had identical marginal distributions, so π and κ yielded identical values. However, this observation changes when we consider the effect of When alliance ties of dyad members are asymmetrically distributed, then it is 'easier' to exhibit a large proportion of dissimilar ties simply by chance. Only κ's chance-correction takes this consideration into account, resulting in a higher chance-dissimilarity of 0.58 compared to the chance-dissimilarity of 0.5 of S and π. Correspondingly, κ's similarity value also increases from 0.2 to 0.31.
In summary, the chance-correction model implicit in S expects that states will agree on 50 per cent of their alliance ties by chance, regardless of the actually observed marginal distributions of the alliance commitments of the two dyad members. The S score is a simple linear transformation of the proportion of dissimilarity. In contrast, the calculation of π and κ does not rely solely on the observed proportion of dissimilarity. Their chance-correction models also take information about the prevalence of certain types of ties into account when calculating similarity scores. For a given observed proportion of dissimilarity, their scores are lower the more prevalent a certain type of tie. In addition, κ also takes into account differential propensities of states to form alliance ties. For a given observed proportion of dissimilarity, the similarity score of κ is higher the larger the differences are between dyad members' marginal proportions.
The value of Cohen's κ can be lower or higher than the value of S, depending on whether the effect of prevalence or the effect of bias outweighs the other (Lantz and Nebenzahl 1996, 434) .
As Scott's π adjusts S only downwards, its similarity score is always the same or lower than the scores of S and κ.
Scott's π and Cohen's κ for quantitative data
Signorino and Ritter's S is routinely calculated on data with valued alliance ties. 11 The two chance-corrected agreement indices are readily extended to the case of interval-level data as well. Krippendorff (1970) provides formulations of π and κ in terms of two variables X and Y, representing the two tie profiles of the dyad members (see also Fay 2005) . To measure the degree of dissimilarity between the two profiles, squared or absolute distances between tie values are often calculated (e.g. Shankar and Bangdiwala 2008, 447) . However, the squared distances are usually preferred "because of historical precedent, simplifications, and some nice properties" (Fay 2005, 175 ; see also Krippendorff 1970, 141) . Unless stated otherwise, I follow this 11 While different types of alliance commitments are regularly treated as if they were ordered on an interval scale, this assumption is extremely questionable and I do not recommend relying on it. Unfortunately, most previous applications of S have treated the strength of alliance commitments as if they were based on quantitative data. Hence, for purely comparative reasons, I follow this practice in the remainder of this paper.
convention in the remainder of this paper. The formulas for Scott's π and Cohen's κ for quantitative data take the following form:
For comparative purposes, S can be expressed in a similar form:
In all three equations, the sum of squared distances in the numerator captures the dissimilarity in the scale values of foreign policy ties. Like in the case of binary ties, the three formulas differ only in the calculation of the dissimilarity expected by chance, which is given in the denominator. Again, the denominator of S is equivalent to the expectation that half of the theoretically possible maximum dissimilarity will occur by chance. The last expression in equation (20) demonstrates that this chance-dissimilarity is equivalent to the sum of the theoretically possible maximum variability of each dyad member's valued tie profile.
The denominator of Scott's π consists of the sum of the observed variability of dyad members' valued tie profiles around the grand mean. The grand mean is simply the average of 12 Valued alliance data of a dyad can be represented in vector form, similar to the binary data example depicted in Figure 2a . The only difference is that the vector entries are not restricted to 0s and 1s, but can range from 0 = 'no commitment', 1 = 'entente', 2 = 'neutrality or nonaggression pact', to 3 = 'defense pact'. All elements of equations (11) to (13) can be directly calculated from the information in those vectors.
the two profile-specific means. Calculating the deviations from the grand mean rather than the profile-specific means reflects the assumption of homogenous marginal distributions. Unlike the chance-correction of S, which uses the mid-point of the scale as the 'grand mean', the chancecorrection of π uses an empirical estimate of the grand mean. In this way, π takes into account that the two distributions might be symmetrically unbalanced or skewed in a similar way towards one or the other end of the scale. In contrast, the denominator of Cohen's κ assumes that chancedissimilarity is equal to the sum of the variability in the two dyad members' valued tie profiles plus the difference in their means. The variability of each tie profile is calculated around its profile-specific mean, implying that no assumption is made that the dyad members' propensity to establish foreign policy ties is identical. Adding the sum of the squared distances of the profilespecific means to κ's denominator indicates that asymmetrically unbalanced distributions are not considered to be a source of dissimilarity. On the contrary, the larger denominator directly results in a larger similarity score. To summarize, when ties are valued, prevalence takes the form of both dyad members having mean tie strength values similarly larger or lower than the mid-point of the scale, and bias takes the form of dyad members differing in their mean tie strength values.
The empirical consequences of chance-correction
Up to this point, I have discussed the conceptual differences between Signorino and Ritter's importance, 'as in some respects the most robust formulation of the democratic peace involves war' (Gartzke 2007, 179) . Despite the prominence of the role of similar interests in Gartzke's theoretical argument, he includes the foreign policy similarity variable only in the analysis of all militarized interstate disputes, not in the analysis of fatal militarized disputes or the analysis of wars. Gartzke (2007, 180) explains that the variable is omitted 'because it is not statistically significant in these regressions'. While my replication results for fatal militarized disputes (Model 9 in Gartzke's Table 2 ) are consistent with this claim, my replications results for war cannot reproduce this finding. In fact, the replication results show a statistically significant positive rather than the expected negative effect of foreign policy similarity on the probability of war onset. Even more problematically, the statistical inferences about two other explanatory variables change once Gartzke's S measure is included in the analysis. 
The proof of the pudding is in the eating
Chance-corrected agreement indices like Scott's π and Cohen's κ have several desirable
properties for measuring the similarity of state's foreign policy positions in the dyadic analysis of international relations. While they assess the dissimilarity of dyad members' foreign policy tie profiles in a similar manner as Signorino and Ritter's S (1999) , π and κ differ crucially to S in the way they standardize the degree of dissimilarity. S relies on a standardization method that is equivalent to a rather arbitrary chance-correction method, which will usually yield implausibly high similarity values. In contrast, the chance-corrections of π and κ are based on the actually observed, empirical distributions of dyad members' foreign policy ties. Both measures adjust the similarity score for states' generally low propensity to form foreign policy ties. In addition, κ also adjusts the similarity score for differences in the individual propensities of states to form foreign policy ties. Whether or not the latter correction is reasonable depends mainly on the process supposed to generate the foreign policy tie data. If the data consist of alliance commitments, then the costs of ties are rather large and the assumption that states have different
propensities to establish such ties seems reasonable. In this case, Cohen's κ is more appropriate than Scott's π. If the data consist of ties that are cheap to establish, such as a similar vote in the General Assembly of the UN, then the assumption that all states have the same propensity to form a tie might be justified. In such a situation, differences in tie-formation reflect real differences in foreign policy positions and π is preferable to κ as a measure of similarity. Table 2 of Gartzke (2007, 181) . The dependent variable is the onset of war. The first model specification excludes any measure of similarity and is a direct replication of Gartzke's results. The second model specification includes Gartzke's original measure of S, which is based on twovalued UN General Assembly voting data that treats abstentions as missing values. The remaining model specifications employ similarity measures that are based on three-valued UN voting data. The third specification includes S based on absolute distances and the fourth includes S based on squared distances.
The last two specifications include Scott's π and Cohen's κ, both based on squared distances. The complete numerical regression results of the replication study are provided in Table A1 in the appendix. 
